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Julien Cerqueira is an energy expert at GRET. He mainly 
participates in projects concerning electricity access in 
rural areas and alternative fuel in several countries in Africa 
and Asia. Founded in 1976, GRET is an international NGO 
bringing together development professionals. It has been 
actively fi ghting poverty and inequalities in the fi eld and on 
all levels by providing sustainable and innovative responses 
for the development of solidarity.
INTRODUCTION 
With an electricity access rate only reaching 
12.3% in 2010, Madagascar is one of Africa’s least 
electrified countries. The situation, common in 
sub-Saharan Africa, is characterized by a very 
strong dichotomy of access between urban 
environments (39% access rate) and rural areas 
(4.8%). This means that close to 14 million rural 
people are still living in the dark, without modern 
energy services (Instat, 2011).
While 77% of the country’s population lives in 
extreme poverty, access to a modern energy 
source seems the prerequisite to increase the 
means of production and thereby economic 
development. Improving access to electricity for 
these rural households is therefore an important 
stake for economic development and improvement 
in living conditions.
The purpose of this article is to present and examine 
the results of the Rhyviere rural electrification 
project1 carried out by GRET in Madagascar 
between 2008 and 2015. This project, which 
benefited to nearly 2,000 households on three 
electrical grids, encourages upscaling to meet the 
challenge of electrification of the whole country. 
It has helped to demonstrate that hydro power 
constitutes a viable technical solution for electrifying 
small urban centers, at a tariff both suited to the 
population’s capacity to pay and providing a revenue 
incentive for the service delegatee.
In a context where practical implementation 
of a relatively stabilized sectoral framework in 
Madagascar is somewhat random, GRET focuses 
on structuring and strengthening a balanced 
coalition of stakeholders. By standardizing the 
sharing of responsibilities between national 
institutions, private businesses, local authorities 
and civil society organizations, the project has 
helped to stabilize the public-private partnership to 
achieve sustainable service for rural populations.
1 Village hydro power grids, energy and respect for the environment
This article analyzes the successes and 
limits of the Rhyviere hydro power project in 
Madagascar and raises questions about the 
role of stakeholders in building an effective 
and sustainable rural electrifi cation model. By 
promoting a delegation model based on strong 
institutions capable of playing their part, this 
experience demonstrates that civil society 
organizations have a role to play in building fair 
and balanced coalitions of stakeholders.
Julien Cerqueira
Project Offi cer - Energy, GRET
cerqueira@gret.org




1. CONTEXT: AN ELECTRICITY REFORM INCAPABLE 
OF LIMITING ELECTRICITY ACCESS INEQUALITY 
IN MADAGASCAR
1.1. PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR 
REFORM IN MADAGASCAR
Aware of the country’s weak electrifi cation strategy and of the need 
to increase energy access for rural populations, in 1998 the Malagasy 
State started to reform the sector, through several key measures:
•  Liberalizing the electricity sector to give new operators the 
opportunity to step in. Breaking the monopoly of Jirama, the 
State company, allowing the electrical energy production, 
transportation and distribution activities to be provided by private 
companies, selected through call for tender2.
•  The Agency for the Regulation of Electricity (ORE) was created as 
an autonomous regulation body. It acts as the usual regulator of 
the sector, setting tariffs, ensuring compliance with standards and 
legal and regulatory provisions, promoting competition and the 
participation of the private sector, while protecting the interests 
of consumers.
•  Establishing financial incentives to fund rural electrification 
through the creation of the National Electricity Fund (FNE). The 
FNE may subsidize up to 70% of the cost of the rural electrical 
infrastructure installed by delegatees3, making it possible to lower 
prices to within the consumers’ capacity to pay.
•  Taking into account the needs of rural populations through the 
creation of the Agency for the Development of Rural Electrifi cation 
(Ader). Ader operates under the Ministry of Energy, with a view to 
increasing the rate of access to electricity of rural populations; 
it promotes and develops new projects, while monitoring 
autonomous centers with installed power under 250 kW4.
Nearly 15 years after the sector’s reforms were adopted, the outcome 
in terms of access to energy remains nevertheless incomplete. The 
reform’s main success is that it has significantly helped increase the 
private sector’s participation. Although Jirama remains the country’s 
main electricity supplier, private operators now generate nearly a 
quarter of the country’s overall production, almost 300 GWh in 2011 
(WWF, 2012). Rural communities are the main benefi ciaries of the reform 
since all rural sites are supplied by private operators. However, the 
sustainability of the infrastructure put in place by these operators is quite 
random: of the 94 rural networks run by operators5, 41 grids were not 
functional at end 2014. Private companies have the worst results, since 
one rural network managed by a delegatee out of two is non-functional.
In addition, the reform did not help attract investors to the rural 
electrifi cation sector. Between 2000 and May 2014, only USD 18.2M6 
2  Authorizing municipalities or associations of users to ensure the provision of the service. This 
possibility was granted through a dispensation procedure requiring no competitive process.
3  In this article we use the term “delegatee” to designate the company to which the State 
outsources the construction, management and maintenance of the service. Malagasy law speaks 
of “licensee” or “concessionaire”, depending on the installed power threshold of the contract.
4  In actual fact, this power limit is not applied. Any autonomous center not supplied by Jirama when 
the Act was passed is placed under the responsibility of Ader.
5  This is inferred from fi gures provided by ORE on 31/12/2014. At that time there were seven 
grids operated by associations or cooperatives, eight by the municipalities and 79 by private 
companies.
6 Source: Ader, from interviews carried out by GRET in 2015.
were invested to develop new projects in total by 
the State, private delegatees or donors, i.e. barely 
over USD 1M per year. This degree of funding is 
therefore particularly low although the financial 
incentives are signifi cant, especially for renewable 
energies.
1.2. THE RHYVIERE PROJECT DESIGNED TO MEET 
THE SECTOR’S WEAKNESSES
In this context, since 2008 GRET, an international 
development NGO, has been implementing the 
Rhyviere project which aims to design, test, and 
popularize mechanisms for the development 
of self-sufficient small hydro power networks 
adapted to the rural context of Madagascar. 
This project is intended to demonstrate the 
development potential of hydro power grids in 
rural areas by creating the conditions to entice 
private operators. Funded by the European Union 
(Energy Facility), Ader and private operators, this 
project has enabled the creation of three electrical 
grids serving approximately 10,000 people across 
5 municipalities in the country.
Designed to mitigate the weaknesses identified 
in the rural electrifi cation sector, the project met 
Figure 1. Project location - Source: FERDI
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with a triple challenge: (i) to develop technical 
models in line with the local context to reduce 
the cost of rural electrification, (ii) to develop a 
methodology to analyze and select the delegatees 
that renders a utility concession attractive for 
private companies, and (iii) to accompany the 
sector’s stakeholders, and in particular the grid 
construction and operation companies, through 
technical support and capacity-building.
The project implementation was considerably 
delayed primarily because of the political crisis 
of 2009 which led to the exile of President Marc 
Ravalomanana and the establ ishment of  a 
transition regime. The national institutions and 
local authorities progressively collapsed until 
the end of 2013, which delayed implementation 
of several project activities, in particular those 
regarding the selection and acknowledgment 
by the State of the delegatees who would be 
providing the electrical service. In addition the 
work has been delayed due to various problems 
- administrative issues (delay in issuing the 
environmental permit, sale of an equipment 
container by the port, etc.), the weather (cyclone 
washing away part of a dam under construction) 
and fi nancial issues (delays in payment of Ader’s 
subsidy, bank credit turned down, etc.). Despite 
these problems, the three hydro power grids were 
completed by the end of the project:
•  The Tolongoina site serving one municipality 
started operating in June 2013;
•  The Sahasinaka site serving three municipalities 
started operating in December 2015;
•  The Ampasimbe site serving one municipality 
started operating in January 2016.
2. INNOVATION TO STRUCTURE THE HYDRO POWER 
SECTOR
2.1. A METHODOLOGY OF ACTION THAT STRUCTURES 
ALL STAKEHOLDERS
The project’s first innovation consisted in designing an operating 
methodology making it possible to structure projects through 
the development of standardized procedures and tools that 
the stakeholders could use when carr ying out their duties. 
Implementation of a hydro power project was divided into 
five phases:
•  Phase 1 - Study: identifi cation of potential sites, reconnaissance 
survey and preliminary design (PD). Once the PD findings have 
been approved by the local authorities, the project is officially 
included in the Rhyviere program;
•  Phase 2 - Fund: selection of the delegatee through call for tender 
and signing of a financing agreement to formalize allocation of 
the investment between the delegatee, Ader, the municipality / 
intermunicipal group and GRET;
•  Phase 3 - Design: detailed design (DD) study to validate the fi nal 
technical sizing of the project. This DD includes, if necessary, an 
environmental impact assessment;
•  Phase 4 - Build: construction, by the delegatee or subcontractors, 
of  th e e l e c tr ic a l  a n d c i v i l  e n gin e e r in g inf r as tr u c tu re s , 
disbursement of subsidies by tranche and network compliance 
certifi ed by ORE;
•  Phase 5 - Operate: training of and support to the delegatee’s 
activities of technical monitoring and commercial management of 
the service, the municipality / intermunicipal grouping and users 
through their association.
Structuring these activities has the advantage of defining the 
role of each stakeholder in the operation, and thus helping each 
stakeholder learn its responsibilities in the electricity service. The 
segmentation of a “typical project” clearly states the responsibilities 
of each stakeholder and structures an implementation methodology 
that had hitherto never been really formalized.
In addit ion,  th is  approach has formal ized the role of  the 
municipalities, which was previously limited to obtaining the 
property rights and easements for the delegatee. In the framework 
of the Rhyviere project, the municipalities now take part firstly 
in the project activities implementation phase (identification of 
potential hydro power sites, presentation and approval of the 
service sizing, participation in delegatee selection, involvement 
in monitoring the works, etc.), and later as local project manager 
for the service, in charge of monitoring and controlling the service 
operation. A concession contract between the municipality and the 
delegatee, appended to the concession award decree, formalizes 
the municipality’s role.
This integration of the municipalities is refl ected fi nancially by a tax 
on each kWh consumed added to the electricity rate to fund public 
lighting and the cost of electricity of municipal public services. This 
tax, returned to the municipality, can also be used to help fund grid 
extensions to new neighborhoods or new connection subsidies.
“THE SEGMENTATION OF A “TYPICAL 
PROJECT” CLEARLY STATES THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH STAKEHOLDER 
AND STRUCTURES AN IMPLEMENTATION 
METHODOLOGY THAT HAD HITHERTO 
NEVER BEEN REALLY FORMALIZED.”
36
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2.2. CO-DESIGNING TECHNICAL STANDARDS TO REDUCE COSTS
Another contribution of this methodological improvement work is 
the optimization of technical standards for electrical grids in rural 
areas. The standards used in Madagascar, formerly based on old 
decrees (1960 to 1964), often taken from urbanized countries, were 
unsuitable for rural electrifi cation. It would entail an overinvestment 
in electrical infrastructure and a reduced profitability of rural 
networks. Defi ning standards adapted to rural electrifi cation and, 
more particularly, to micro hydro power, was one of the program’s 
areas requiring work to improve the sector’s development. This 
was all the more relevant because in Madagascar there is no 
real technological constraint for hydro power in particular, and 
for rural electrification in general: skills in electricity, hydrology 
and electro-mechanics are available and a few international 
turbine manufacturers have local agents. The challenge was 
therefore to reduce costs to facilitate the implementation of 
electrifi cation projects.
The GRET team carried out a technical standards optimization 
process together with Ader and ORE in order to defi ne requirement 
levels suited to the local context, without sacrificing the required 
safety of these infrastructures. After working several months with 
the competent authorities, two guides were designed:
•  Specifications for the design of hydro power 
networks in rural areas: it provides lighter 
design standards for the construction of micro 
hydro power stations and electrical rural grids 
and recommends the methodology to carry out 
studies and choose financing: orchestrating 
investments to avoid overinvestment at the 
project launch, contents of the preliminary 
design studies, recommendations for the sizing 
of the infrastructure according to the context, 
templates for works drawings, etc.;
•  Specifi cations for the operation and maintenance 
of hydro power networks in rural areas:  it 
specifies the standards to adopt in order to 
ensure a high service quality in compliance with 
the regulations in force and to maximize the 
service life of each network component. It details 
the activities required to operate, maintain, and 
service a rural electrical network, by equipment 
type (dam, civil engineering works, turbine, grid, 
etc.) and provides recommendations on the 
necessary skills and personnel.
Role of stakeholders in service implementation and monitoring
GRET
Support for project 
management
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all stakeholders in the service 
implementation
State
Project manager for the electricity service
Agency for the 

















Agency for the Regulation 
of Electricity (ORE)
Regulation body















Notifi es Ader 






Legal and contractual relationship
Mediation relationship
Mini-grids: it is essential to adapt to local 




These two documents are designed as proper 
g u i d e s  to  s u p p o r t  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of 
investment, by either the delegatee or projects 
sponsors (donors, NGOs, etc.). They have not yet 
legally replaced previous regulations, but they 
have been used since their inception as a required 
part of Ader’s calls for tender for rural networks.
2.3. THE ENVIRONMENT-ENERGY CONNECTION: 
AN ORIGINAL APPROACH FOR RESOURCE 
SUSTAINABILITY
The project tested on one of the sites integrating 
an environmental protection component with 
a view to achieving sustainability of the water 
resource, resulting in a mechanism of Payment 
of Environmental Services (PES)7. The watershed 
whose point of concentration is a waterfall used 
by the Tolongoina project mainly consists of a 
protected forest area. The agricultural activities 
in  th is  basin pose t wo major  r isks for  the 
preservation of the water resource: (i) a decline 
in water quality through increased erosion, which 
may silt up the facilities and damage the turbine 
blades by abrasion from sand; (ii) an irregular river 
fl ow, with a decrease during low water periods and 
an increased risk of fl ooding during rains.
7  This work was carried out together with a team from the Institut de 
Recherche pour le Développement (IRD) working on environmental 
services, within the framework of the SERENA program dealing with 
issues related to the emergence and implementation of the notion of 
“environmental service” in the fi eld of public policies for rural areas. 
SERENA is a research project carried by IRD, CIRAD and IRSTEA 
between 2009 and 2013. It brought together some 30 researchers.
The Tolongoina site, with a small watershed (6 km²) limiting the 
number of stakeholders involved, was the perfect place to conduct 
an experiment on a PES mechanism. In the past, confl icts had arisen 
because the municipality banned slash-and-burn practices, so it 
seemed relevant to begin negotiations to recognize and reward the 
services rendered by watershed users in maintaining and developing 
agricultural practices compatible with the provision of water 
services. The PES mechanism was all the more relevant because the 
farmers in the watershed were not going to benefi t from the village 
electrifi cation project.
The originality of IRD’s approach was based on the co-construction 
of knowledge concerning the hydrological services, in order 
to formalize with the populations of the watershed a shared 
understanding of both the hydrological services and the perceptions 
of compatible activities and those that pose a risk to these services. 
Interviews with farmers and electricity users led to a consensus on 
the fact that certain agricultural activities threatened the quantity 
and quality of the water resource.
On the basis of this consensus, new discussions were carried out to 
convince the electricity users of the need to set up a compensation 
mechanism for the service suppliers to adapt their practices 
in order to ensure the sustainability of the water resource. The 
PES mechanism is therefore built around a contribution from the 
service benefi ciaries (users through their association, municipality, 
delegatee) paid to the suppliers of the environmental service to 
compensate them. This contribution is considered “voluntary” 
because all service beneficiaries have voluntarily decided on 
the principle of contribution and its amount. The payback for 
this compensation is the adoption or strengthening of practices 
conducive to the preservation of the water resource.
Water sharing and deforestation in the watershed - Source: GRET
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The PES contract, which sets forth the organization of compensation 
between suppliers and recipients of the Environmental Service (ES), 
was signed in September 2013. This agreement formalizes the creation 
of the Andasy watershed management committee (KOMSAHA), whose 
board brings together representatives of the parties to the agreement, 
and organizes the payment of the contributions of each ES benefi ciary: 
a 2.5% tax on the monthly electrical consumption of subscribers; fl at 
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3. RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE RHYVIERE PROJECT
Table 1. Main features of the three grids set up by the Rhyviere project
Site Tolongoina Sahasinaka Ampasimbe*
Region Vatovavy Fitovinany Vatovavy Fitovinany Atsinanana
Nbr of municipalities 1 3 1
Target population 355 households 900 households
700 households
(1,500 households)
Installed power capacity 2 x 60 kW 3 x 80 kW
3 x 80 kW
(2 x 330 kW)
Investment budget



















*  During the detailed design study, the delegatee of the Ampasimbe site decided to increase site capacity by eventually installing two 330 kW turbines in order to sell the surplus 
power to the Jirama electrical grid of the seaside town of Foulepointe some 20 km away. The fi gures in brackets concern this new sizing.
**  The fi nancial sustainability outlook for the Tolongoina site being fairly weak, it was decided with Ader and ORE to increase the subsidy amount relative to the 70% ceiling 
usually allowed. The delegate’s investment is therefore less than that for other sites.
rates of MGA 100,000 per month (EUR 29) for the 
delegatee and MGA 90,000 per month (EUR 26) 
for the municipality. The annual amount is expected 
to be MGA 3.4M (EUR 971), which should serve to 
support the implementation of the conservation 
agricultural activities and the conservation of the 
forest in the basin.
Mini-grids: it is essential to adapt to local 





3.1. A QUALITY OF SERVICE DESPITE PERSISTENT 
INEQUALITY OF ACCESS
Many constraints, in particular concerning the 
political situation in Madagascar, have caused 
the Rhyviere project to experience a significant 
delay which has shifted the start of service of 
the hydroelectric networks. An analysis of the 
operating data of the Tolongoina site, operational 
since June 2013, nevertheless shows that the 
proposed electrification solutions are suitable to 
the rural context. The data from the fi rst two years 
of operation, as well as the satisfaction survey 
carried out by the project, confi rm the good results:
•  The number of subscribers has achieved after 
two years of service the planned forecast for the 
sixth year of operation, while new connection 
applications are pending because of meter 
stockouts;
•  The average consumption per subscriber is 
consistent with forecasts. It shows a non-linear 
but constant rise since the start of service;
•  Over one-third of households have acquired 
electrical equipment (radio, television, DVD player);
•  87% of the local firms were connected to the 
network in the first six months of operation, 
and seven new companies were created during 
this period as a direct result of the arrival of 
electricity (grocery store, bar, electronic repair 
workshop, multimedia store). In addition, 29% 
of businesses said they had acquired new equipment after the 
electrical grid started operating (refrigerators and freezers, 
soldering iron, mixer robot, multimedia equipment, etc.). However, 
no specifi c study has been carried out to quantify specifi cally the 
impact of electricity on these companies’ turnover;
•  Peak consumption rose from 49 kW in 2013 to 55 kW in 2014. 
The installed power of 60 kW has now been reached, which makes 
the purchase of a second turbine a priority;
Table 2. Key fi gures of the Tolongoina hydro power network 
(June 2013 - May 2015)
Number of subscribing households 200
Average consumption per subscriber 24 kWh/month
Peak consumption 55 kW
Connection rate 56% of households
Connection subsidy MGA 50,000 (€ 14)
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“THE LACK OF CONTROL AND REGULATION OF 
THE DELEGATEES AND THEIR LOW FINANCIAL 
INVESTMENT IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE 
CONSTRUCTION SEEM TO BE THE MAIN REASONS 
FOR THE CONTINUAL WEAKENING OF CONCESSION 
CONTRACTS SANCTIONED IN THE PAST.”
40
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•  Subscribers are mostly satisfi ed with the quality of service and the 
electricity tariff. The collection rate exceeds 95%;
•  The delegatee controls his grid and performs his duties. He carries 
out improvements on the infrastructure to limit the risk of outages 
and of service interruption. Service availability is greater than 
95%, in accordance with the requirements of the public service 
concession contract.
However, a closer analysis of consumption data shows that it is 
the more affluent households (and thus those having a higher 
individual consumption) that are connected. Thus, according to 
the satisfaction survey GRET carried out after 6 months of service, 
98% of affl uent households and 52% of medium income households 
were connected to the network, but only 3% of poor households8. 
Although a connection plan had been specially designed for poor 
households, the “lightbulb fl at rate”, allowing connection without a 
meter to operate only one or two lightbulbs9. Despite very attractive 
pricing, and even though connection was subsidized, only 6% of 
households are connected to this „lightbulb flat rate“. Therefore 
the good results of the Tolongoina grid probably mask a strong 
inequality in access to the service.
This phenomenon can be explained by (i) the nature of the subsidy 
mechanism, of the type Output Based Aid, which encourages the 
8  Household categorization is based on a combination of criteria: main activity of the head of the 
household, education level, occupancy status, dwelling type (general condition, walls and roof).
9  This package allows poor households to benefi t from lighting at a very reduced price, less than 
the average expenditure for lighting with an oil lamp.
delegatee to make network connections quickly. 
Poor households, waiting for the service to be 
tried and tested before connecting to the grid 
so as not to “lose” their investment, benefit less 
from subsidies; and (ii) a higher connection cost 
for poor households due to the grid confi guration, 
w h i c h  c o v e r s  t h e  m a i n  r o a d s  w h e n  s u c h 
households tend to be on secondary roads; (iii) 
a policy of the delegatee to willingly promote full 
connection at the expense of the “lightbulb flat 
rate”, less attractive fi nancially.
Although it is complex to target the poorest so that 
they can benefi t most from connection subsidies 
or to encourage them to connect to the grid from 
the fi rst months of service, new strategies can be 
set up to reduce inequality of access to electricity. 
This can go be done by (i) better sizing of the 
electrical grid during the design phase to setup 
low-voltage lines passing through the heart of 
low income neighborhoods, thus reducing the 
cost of connection, (ii) mobilizing municipalities 
to allocate connection subsidies, (iii) raising 
awareness among the poorest households at 
the start of service, or (iv) dividing the subsidies 
between the meter subscription and the fl at rate 
subscription, to ensure all subsidies do not solely 
go to more affl uent households.
Tolongoina grid - Source: GRET
Mini-grids: it is essential to adapt to local 
technical and economic constraints
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3.2. THE PERFECT DELEGATEE: AN INVESTOR WITH 
FUNDING AND TECHNICAL SKILLS
The delegatee is the cornerstone of the service. 
The relative weakness of national institutions, 
combined with their limited means of control and 
regulation, puts sole responsibility for service 
quality squarely on the delegatee’s shoulders; 
it is therefore important to select a competent 
delegatee. The delegatees selected for the 
Rhyviere project sites had very varied profi les:
•  Tolongoina site: small electricity business made 
up by several shareholders including university 
professors specialized in energy. The delegatee 
had good technical skills but little experience in 
construction projects.
•  S a h a s i n a k a  s i t e :  a  s m a l l  c o n s t r u c t i o n 
company. The delegatee turned to outside 
service providers for the electrical skills and 
construction of the dam.
•  Ampasimbe site: civil engineering and drilling 
company, whose CEO comes from the project 
area. His profi le is more like that of an investor 
who expects a return on investment in the 
long term. He has acquired in his company 
the required technical skills in electricity and 
demonstrated a true capability to carry out the 
infrastructure works.
For each site, the tenders were assessed on the 
basis of precise criteria. The technical proposal 
was analyzed first, and only tenders attaining a 
minimum of 60 points were shortlisted. Next the 
financial evaluation graded proposals on the basis of the amount 
of the subsidy requested to carry out the work and the proposed 
electricity rates.




Activities and experiences in construction and 
management of an electrical network
20
Proposed solutions for the construction 
of infrastructure
30
Proposed solutions for management 
and provision of the service
30
Understanding of public 
service concession
10
Motivation for the project 10
The lessons learned during the project serve to emphasize the key 
aspects of the delegatee profi le:
•  Broader skills: the delegatee’s function is multifarious, calling 
on a variety of skills, both technical and in administration, 
logistics, supervision, management and negotiation. Delegatees 
with good technical skills in the field of electricity can be very 
quickly overwhelmed by the constraints of building hydroelectric 
infrastructure and managing the service. Technical skills, while 
necessary, are insuffi cient on their own;
•  Suitable fi nancial capabilities: the delegatee, who must cover at 
least 30% of the investment, must be able to obtain this funding. 
The project has experienced several delays because it did not 
check the fi nancial standing of the delegatees, on the one hand 
Sahasinaka hydroelectric dam - Source: GRET
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because it is diffi cult to assess the fi nancial standing of a business 
when the data supplied by the bidders is not standard and hard to 
check, and on the other hand, because a bidder may indicate he 
will use of a line of credit but subsequently not be granted credit 
once the concession contract has been signed;
•  Investor more than entrepreneur: the delegatee must develop, as 
soon as he is selected, a medium- or even long-term vision of his 
activity10. This implies in the fi rst place understanding that a utility 
concession contract is not a works contract: since the return on 
investment is only possible if service continuity is maintained, 
the delegatee must promote equipment quality rather than cost 
reductions that could subsequently lower the profitability of its 
investment.
The ideal profi le to become a delegatee is that of an investor with 
a service vision and sufficient financial resources, or the ability 
to mobilize such resources, supported by a team with quality 
technical expertise.
3.3. A MECHANISM FOR PAYMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 
WITH MODEST BUT PROMISING IMPACT
After almost two years of operation, the PES contract has shown 
that though limited, its effects are real. The money collected has 
been used to roll out several activities planned in the watershed 
management scheme, such as monitoring trips to check the state 
of preservation of the forest or the development of food crops 
compatible with the protection of the catchment area (beans, 
peanuts, demonstration plot on good practices for growing 
ginger, etc.). Even if the impact of these activities on the quality 
of the environmental service is as yet limited, they serve to 
improve farmers’ living conditions. The farmers regularly submit 
projects to the committee, which approves funding and supports 
implementation of the projects.
In the end, it appears that the biggest success of the PES 
mechanism is to have encouraged a dialog between the inhabitants 
of the watershed and populations living downstream, on the subject 
of water resource preservation. While the service providers do 
not benefit from the effects of electrification, they have agreed 
“as a service” because their problems are being considered by 
the beneficiaries (Toillier, 2011). The watershed management 
committee becomes a sustainable structure rewarding agricultural 
practices compatible with proper operation of the hydro power 
station, while at the same time the farmers acquire these good 
practices. The method based on co-constructing a shared vision 
around hazards and good practices seems to have created favorable 
conditions for acceptance of the PES mechanism.
The main weakness of the mechanism, in addition to the fact that 
the money collected is insuffi cient to cover all activities identifi ed 
as necessary to preserve the water resource, lies in the difficulty 
of monitoring this mechanism, which is not part of an independent 
project management. The Tolongoina municipality cannot perform 
this function as it is itself the benefi ciary of the ES and stakeholder 
of the PES contract. The system is missing a third stakeholder 
10  In Madagascar, rural electrifi cation concession contracts are usually granted for a period 
of 20 to 30 years. ORE defi nes the duration of the concession contract as a function of the 
forecast business plan of the service, in order to guarantee a suffi cient return on investment to 
the delegatee.
who would guarantee the preservation of the 
water service. GRET will continue to perform 
this function as long as it is present in the area, 
but its role is not to continue supporting the 
local operators in implementing this contract. 
The PES contract renewal in 2016 should provide 
the opportunity to fi ll this gap.
4. THE REASON FOR THE SUCCESS 
OF THE RHYVIERE PROJECT: 
THE CREATION OF A STAKEHOLDER 
COALITION BETWEEN PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES, BUSINESSES 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY
4.1. THE NEED FOR A STRONG PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
TO SUPPORT PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP
The analysis of concession practices and relations 
between the State, the construction owner 
through Ader and the delegatee, shows that public 
authorities do not really carry out their duties 
under the law, which undermines the public-
private partnership. Whereas the legal framework 
in Madagascar is fairly well designed and the 
institutional framework has been stable for nearly 
15 years, delegatees are barely controlled and 
poorly regulated, which seems to be the main 
source for the continual weakening of sanctioned 
concession contracts. Experience acquired on the 
Rhyviere project shows, on the contrary, all the 
importance of having a strong public authority 
to encourage the sustainability of public-private 
partnerships.
This is illustrated on the question of control of 
the investment made by the delegatees. Since 
it is mainly the delegatees who carry out the 
service sizing preliminary studies (PD and DD), 
they themselves define the total amount of the 
investment on which their subsidy will be indexed. 
However, Ader does not have the means to analyze 
these technical files in depth, which leaves the 
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door open for the delegatee to overestimate the 
investment, therefore raising the amount of the 
subsidy it receives. This is even more plausible 
since Ader does not check the investment made 
by the delegatee during the works, since it has no 
permanent presence on the worksites and does 
not mandate an independent works controller. 
Delegatees may can therefore play with the 
specifications of materials and declare costs of 
works exceeding actual costs.
The assumption that we make as a result of these 
observations is that several delegatees have 
invested nothing or very little in building their 
infrastructure. By overestimating the investment 
budget in the preliminary studies and by reducing 
the quality of the work, it would be possible for a 
delegatee to carry out the work without investing 
its own contribution, and even make a profi t. If he 
does not invest, the delegatee‘s position changes 
from that of concessionaire to lessor (Levy and 
Ged, 2007), which changes his assessment of the 
risk. This may explain the high proportion of grids 
abandoned by private delegatees: a company not 
constrained by return on investment can drop the 
service in the event of diffi culties.
The methodology GRET deployed has ensured 
that delegatees invest. It established three levels 
of control: (i) the level of subsidy to be received by 
the delegatee is calculated on the basis of the pre-
project study, the preliminary design, carried out 
by the project team; (ii) GRET checked on funds 
disbursed by the delegatee, through their invoices 
of equipment and supplies; (iii) the works carried 
out are inspected by the project team, as well as by 
an engineering fi rm mandated by the municipality. 
GRET has helped Ader gain awareness of its 
responsibilities and has demonstrated the need to 
structure a strong public authority to implement a 
public-private partnership.
4.2. INTEGRATING LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 
A NECESSARY LINK TO BALANCE THE CONCESSION 
CONTRACT AND ENSURE LOCAL POPULATIONS 
RECEIVE BETTER SERVICE
Madagascar’s institutional framework gives 
local authorities a limited role. Since project 
ownership for rural electrifi cation is national, local 
authorities are poorly informed of the issues in 
this sector and only slightly involved in projects. 
These municipalities nevertheless have a role 
to play in the project management of the rural 
electrifi cation scheme, and can complement the 
national authorities:
•  Local authorities can play a part in identifying 
projects and prioritizing needs. The approach 
used for the Rhyviere project thus relied on 
(i) involving the municipalities to identif y 
potential energy resources in their territory and (ii) testing a 
municipal electrifi cation planning scheme to determine the need 
and demand for electricity, propose solutions adapted to each 
site, and prioritize the most relevant projects. The municipalities 
can reclaim control over the issues of rural electrifi cation, which 
are debated as a component of local development;
•  The municipalities must be integrated in the monitoring and the 
local regulation of the service. In a context where Ader and ORE are 
distant from the electrifi ed sites and do not have suffi cient means 
to monitor the situation properly, turning to local authorities is a 
good way of balancing the public-private partnership. A contract 
between the delegatee and the municipality makes it possible to 
designate the municipality as project owner, acting on behalf of 
the Ministry for Energy, in order to control the quality of the public 
service and monitor the delegatee. The municipality thus becomes 
local regulator guaranteeing compliance with the social purpose of 
the service.
4.3. ROLE OF NGOS: COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES, SUPPORT 
TO STAKEHOLDERS AND SECURING THE CONCESSION CONTRACT
Alongside stakeholders acknowledged by the legal framework and 
those whose legitimacy lies in their local presence, what is the role 
of the NGOs who often sponsor rural electrifi cation projects? In the 
example of the Rhyviere project, GRET facilitated structuring the 
coalition of stakeholders, which gave it strength and relevance.
Firstly, GRET defended before the other stakeholders the strict 
observance of the legal framework, so often neglected. Whereas 
traditional concession practices were completely divorced from 
the very letter of the law, GRET based its actions on compliance 
with these rules and pushed for their application. The control 
mechanisms deployed around the main steps of the project have 
therefore encouraged, or even forced, the other stakeholders to play 
their part in the public-private partnership.
Secondly, the presence of GRET contributed to the emergence of a 
better understanding of the interactions between the stakeholders. 
Ader, ORE, delegatees, engineering fi rms, municipalities and users’ 
associations were strengthened both to ensure they understood 
their role in the country‘s rural electrification strategy, and to 
enable them acquiring a better knowledge of the other players in the 
sector. An effective coalition of stakeholders can only emerge when 
businesses, local authorities and national administrations perceive 
themselves as partners committed toward achieving the same goal.
Finally, the work to formalize the standards, procedures and tools 
carried out by the project team constitutes a basis that makes the 
public-private partnership safer, for the national authorities and the 
delegatees as well. The project feedback shows that delegatees are 
reassured by good quality data and well-established procedures. 
Far from slowing down electrification project implementation, 
the steps of diagnosis, sizing, and control ensure a better chance 





The lessons learned from the Rhyviere project provide 
options to improve the mechanism for concessions in 
Madagascar. Whereas the legal framework is stable and 
the competency of both public and private stakeholders 
is rising, improvements are needed to enhance the 
impact of rural electrification projects:
•  Public authorities must impose their definition of the 
infrastructure, particularly so when they subsidize 
a part of the works. Using independent engineering 
firms to carry out the preliminary design studies and 
to control the delegatees will ensure the delegatee’s 
level of financial investment is adequate;
•  The delegatee’s financial commitment must be real 
and relatively high: it is a pledge of motivation and 
moral commitment to the service. As a corollary, it 
is necessary to develop financing solutions allowing 
private companies to engage in rural electrification 
projects;
•  The local authorities must take part in the project 
ownership to complement the national authorities. 
They can act as local regulators, capable of balancing 
the concession contract to guarantee the social goal 
of the service.
Final ly,  the project has highlighted the fact that 
coalitions of stakeholders comprising the State, local 
communities, businesses and civil society organizations 
are capable of providing innovative solutions to meet 
the challenge of rural electrification. By avoiding the 
pitfalls of dogmatism and simplification, these open and 
balanced coalitions can offer appropriate solutions to 
promote universal access to energy that is affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and modern.
A question nevertheless remains: the impact of the 
project on economic development and on the living 
conditions of households. The analysis of the Tolongoina 
site, in service for more than two years, suggests a true 
impact: many households have acquired electrical 
equipment, craftsmen have adapted their production 
tools, health centers have electricity 24/7. However, it 
would be necessary to carry out a more precise analysis 
of these phenomena to better quantify and understand 
the project‘s actual socio-economic impact.
A new phase of the project, started in 2015, covers the 
electrification of three new sites to serve approximately 
50,000 beneficiaries in the regions of Sofia, Haute 
Matsiatra and Amoron’I Mania. It incorporates a specific 
component to encourage economic development by 
supporting the small and medium enterprises of the 
towns concerned. This specific work should strengthen 
the effects of electrification on the populations and 
improve living conditions in the target areas.
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